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Multilateralism or Regionalism; what
can be done about the proliferation of
regional trading agreements?

Luwam G. Dirar
LL.M. candidate, 2009

Abstract
Regional trading agreements are treaties entered into by states. 1 States enter into
regional trading agreements for different reasons some of which are economic, political
and security reasons. Regional trading agreements (herein after RTAs) have been
successful in achieving trade liberalization at a much faster speed than the World Trade
Organization (herein after WTO). 2 The most notable example of RTAs is the European
Communities that has been successful to liberalize both trade in goods and services.
Members of those Regional Trading Agreements create rules of origin. Rules of
origin are important in allocating the appropriate duty for imported goods. They tell the
customs officer where those goods come from. If they come from a country which has a
trading agreement with the importing state then the product will receive preferential
treatment. The problem at the moment is that there are over four hundred Regional
Trading Agreements in the world today.

This proliferation of Regional Trading

Agreements resulted into a lot of crisscrossing and very complicated rule of origin. The
main purpose of this paper is to analyze the different possible solutions for the
proliferation of Regional Trading Agreements and to propose the most realistic solution
to the problem.
To perform this task the paper will be divided into three parts. The paper relied
both on direct and indirect research methodologies to answer the questions posed by the

1

The word regional trading agreement doesn’t have any geographical connotation. It can be a trade agreement
between countries in different continents without any geographical boundary links.
2
The World Trade Organization is a multilateral trading system that came into existence in January 1995. Some
pose the argument if the WTO is at all multilateral by saying Russia and Ukraine are not even members of the WTO.
However, as of July 23, 2008 the WTO has 153 members and 30 more on observer status. Full list of countries and
country specific reports available at http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm accessed on
02/10/2009.

2

research paper. The first part deals with the legal and historical background of RTAs. It
answers question of why states enter into RTAs and what is the legal basis for the
formation of RTAs. The second part deals with proliferation of RTAs. It answers
question like are RTAs stumbling blocks or building blocks to the multilateral trading
system. It also describes the causes of proliferation of RTAs and the possible solutions.
The third part deals with the conclusions and recommendations. It tells the reader the
overall conclusion of the paper and the best solution proposed.
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PART I- Historical and legal background of Regional trading
agreements under the WTO
1.1. Introduction
The whole purpose of the WTO is to lower tariff and non tariff barriers. 3 “We know since
Adam Smith the best way to do it is unilaterally and we also know from political economy that
countries have hard time to do it unilaterally…” 4

Countries enter into multilateral trading

agreements such as the WTO and various RTAs because they are afraid to lower tariffs and non
tariff barriers unilaterally. 5 They cooperate to liberalize trade in an effort to constrain or
eliminate restrictions on trade.

RTAs achieve trade liberalization at a much faster speed and cover areas that are not yet
covered by the WTO. 6 Some countries enter into RTAs for political reasons. “International
cooperation is not about the elimination of economic externalities only but also political
externalities.” 7 For instance, the African Caribbean Pacific (herein after ACP) and European
Union Economic partnership agreement is an example of trade agreement based on political

3

The WTO has been working to lower tariffs and non tariff barriers through its successive negotiations. For
instance, Article II and art XI of GATT requires states to bind their tariffs and prohibits quantitative restrictions.
4
Garry Hofbuer from Peterson Institute of International Economics at Washington DC, WTO public forum
2007, http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/debates_e/debate3_e.htm accessed on 10/11/2008.
5
The GATT has substantially lowered tariffs and non-tariff barriers through the successive rounds it has passed. For
instance, “While postwar tariffs averaged some 40 percent in industrial goods, MFN tariffs among industrialized
countries will be down from 6.3 percent (Tokyo Round) to an average of 3.8 upon implementation of the Uruguay
Round.” Thomas Cottier, The Challenge of WTO Law: Collected Essays, Cameron May Ltd, 2007, at 513.
6
Gary Hofbuer, Supra note 2.
7
Alexander Keck et al, “Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement Institutions in Trade
Agreements”, World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division, September 2007 at 7.

6

reasons. The agreement covers ACP countries that were former colonies of European Union. 8
Some regional trade agreements are also driven by economic reasons. Countries enter into RTAs
to eliminate constraints on trade. Trade protection by one country can affect the benefits of
another state. 9

1.2. Drafting History
The drafting history of article XXIV of GATT dates back to the International Trade
Organization. 10 “The provisions in the Havana Charter on economic integration arrangements
differed considerably from the corresponding provisions in previous drafts of the Charter.” 11
Unlike the previous drafts that only recognized the establishment of customs unions the Havana
Charter incorporated a provision for the formation of Free Trade Agreements. In the previous
drafts Free Trade Agreements were allowed as an interim agreement that lead to customs unions.
This regional trading arrangements provision was adopted in GATT-1947 and later on in the
WTO through the Uruguay Round.

8

Informal discussion with Maria Fariello, EU lawyer in Eritrea, January 19, 2009, at about 9:00 p.m. We were
discussing why the African countries agreed to join the Cotonou Agreement (ACP-EU) agreement and she told me
that some countries join regional trading agreements for the compensation package offered by the developed
countries. See also Oliver Cadot et al, ‘Can Bilateralism Ease the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalization?’ World
Trade Organization-Economic Research Analysis Division, June 1998. In this article the authors analyzed the
impact of compensation package in regional trading agreements and concluded that regional trading agreements
with compensation package tend to be more successful.
9
For instance, if country A prohibits entry for goods produced in country B, the welfare of country B is affected by
protectionist restrictions imposed by country A. If the goods manufactured in country B are produced by imports
from country C, the protectionist measures of country A can affect also country C.
10
The International Trade Organization was an organization (herein after ITO) that was intended to be established in
the Breton Woods Agreement at the same time with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Some
attribute the failure of the establishment of the ITO to the United States Congress and President Truman. That is to
say because US, the largest economy, did not ratify the charter establishing the ITO it was doomed to failure. Then
certain countries entered into a provisional agreement, GATT that led to the WTO. For a brief explanation of the
failure of the ITO and the Havana Charter refer to Julio Lacarte Muro’s interview with the Keith Rockwell (WTO
spokesperson) about how the trading system evolved available
at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/debates_e/interview1_e.htm accessed on January 10,2009.
11
Multilateral Trade Negotiations – Uruguay Round, 11 August, 1987. Note by the Secretariat on Article XXIV,at 7.
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1.3 Formation of Regional Trading Agreements
The first wave of regional trading agreements was primarily North-North and SouthSouth Agreements. 12 “North- South arrangements appeared during the 1980s.” 13 When a WTO
member enters into a regional trading agreement it departs from the main pillars of nondiscrimination. 14 However, Article XXIV of General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (herein
after, GATT), article V of General Agreement on Trade in Services (herein after GATS) and the
Enabling clause 15 allow member countries to enter into regional trading agreements. Since the
wording and terminologies of article XXIV of GATT and article V of GATS are similar; for the
purpose of this study we will just deal with article XXIV of GATT. Since the number of regional
trading agreements notified under the Enabling clause is so small the study will not deal with it.

12

Oliver Cadot et al, ‘Can Bilateralism Ease the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalization?’ World Trade
Organization- Economic Research Analysis Division, June 1998, at 6. North-North agreements means regional
trading agreements among developed countries and likewise South-South means the once entered among developing
countries. It was also generally thought that the North-North agreements are successful as compared with the SouthSouth agreements.
13
Id. Note that Art V of GATS allows for Special and differential treatment for developing countries in regional
trading agreements unlike article XXIV of GATT. In the current Doha Negotiation the ACP countries submitted a
proposal to amend article XXIV(8) of GATT to allow the S and D treatment for developing countries. In an in depth
study of regional trading agreements and their implication for developing countries, UNCTAD concluded that
developing countries should proceed carefully with regard to North-South regional trading agreements. The study
concluded that North-South agreements tend to ignore the development perspective. The GATT rules require
reciprocity in North-South agreements and erode preferences. The developed countries tend to ask for WTO plus
standard due to the unbalanced negotiating power between developed and developing countries.
14
The relevant non-discrimination principles of the WTO are the National treatment (Article I) and the Most
Favored Nation Treatment (Article III). The main principle of Article I is that member states are not allowed to
discriminate imported goods from locally produced good once they are inside the border. Article III of the GATT
enumerates the Most Favored Nation Treatment which basically means that countries are not allowed to discriminate
among other WTO member trading partners.
15
The Enabling Clause (i.e., the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries) also allows the formation of Regional Trading Agreements among
developing countries without the requirement of non-reciprocity. For further explanation of the enabling clause and
the full text of the clause refer to, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm , accessed on
March 13, 2009.

8

1.4 Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas
Article XXIV of GATT allows the formation of Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas.
According to Article XXIV (8(a)) a Customs Union “… shall be understood to mean the
substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories.” 16 Members of a
Customs Union are mandated to have a ‘substantially the same’ customs policy against other
states that are not members of the customs union. 17 Whereas a Free Trade Agreement mandates
members to open up ‘substantially all trade’ amongst themselves as defined in Article XXIV
(8(b)) and it does not require the existence of common customs policy towards nonmembers.

Scholars have debated the interpretation of article XXIV of GATT. There are different
issues that can be raised with the interpretation of Article XXIV. For the purpose of this study we
are just focusing on ‘substantially all trade.’ The reason we are discussing this particular issue is
because it will be relevant to our discussion in part two and three of this paper.

16

Article XXIV (8) states,

“For the purposes of this Agreement:
(a)
A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs
territory for two or more customs territories, so that
(i)

duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least with
respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, and,

(ii)

subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other
regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of
territories not included in the union…”

17

The Appellate Body in the Turkey-Textiles case said ‘substantially all’ under article XXIV (8(a)) doesn’t mean
all.

9

Past discussions in the GATT indicate that the term ‘substantially all’ has both qualitative
and quantitative aspects. “Regarding the quantitative aspect, it has been suggested that a general
figure could be fixed for the percentage of volume of liberalized trade within a free trade area
which should be considered as meeting the ‘substantially all …’ requirement.” 18 However,
arguments were raised how inappropriate it would be to measure trade liberalization just in
quantitative measurements. The qualitative aspect of the ‘substantially all’ requirement is that the
regional trade agreement should not exclude a particular sector or industry from the liberalization
activity. The EU subscribes to this view and fixed that 80% of the volume of the trade should be
included. 19

1.4 Conclusion
Regional trade agreements achieve trade liberalization at a much faster speed. States
enter into regional trading agreements both for political and economic reasons. When states enter
into regional trading agreements Art XXIV of GATT requires that they liberalize ‘substantially
all trade’ between them. The criteria for determining the substantially all requirement is both
qualitative and quantitative aspects.

18
19

Id.
Thomas Cottier, The Challenge of WTO Law: Collected Essays, Cameron May Ltd., 2007, at 517.
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Part II – Proliferation of Regional Trading Agreements
2.1. Stumbling blocks or Building blocks
Regionalism and multilateralism are complementary. 20 “While we may see them as
competing legal approaches, in a combination they assist in the process of dismantling of trade
barriers.”

21

The WTO rules are constitutional frame work of rights and obligations of member

countries in international trade. “The rules of GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V and the
Enabling Clause could be interpreted as setting the multilateral constitutional limits within which
RTAs can maneuver.” 22 The formation of regional trading arrangements is an exception to the
general principles of WTO.

23

That is to say, states are allowed to enter into RTAs as long as

those agreements are consistent with the existent WTO rules.

The problem at the moment is that there are more than 400 regional trading agreements.
24

Each regional arrangement is unique. The working provision of the arrangement and the

20

The argument of whether regional trading agreements are stumbling blocks or building blocks in the multilateral
trading system revolves over the idea of the impact of the formation of regional trading agreements. Regional trade
agreements can create trade to the contracting parties and it can also create trade diversion to non members of the
agreement. Trade creation is in a sense that regional trading agreements tend to create access to bigger market
among contracting parties. It diverts trade for non-members in a sense that it gives preference in the form of
reduction of tax value for members of the regional trading agreement. “WTO rules are an attempt to encourage trade
creation, and to avoid diversion.” Thomas Cottier, The Challenges of WTO Law: Collected Essays”, Cameron May
Ltd, 2007, at 516. The WTO rules try to avoid trade diversion by including the ‘substantially all requirement we
discussed in first part of this paper.’
21
Thomas Cottier, Supra note 19 at 514.
22
Youri Devouyist et al, The World Trade Organization and Regional Trading agreements: Bridging the
Constitutionality Gap, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol 18.1, 2007 at 4.
23
Peter Van Den Bossche, The law and Policy of World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge
University Press, 2005, at 650.
24
Out of those 400 regional trading agreements only 227 are in force. For a complete list of Regional Trading
Agreements and their legal basis see http://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicPreDefRepByWTOLegalCover accessed on
02/10/2009.
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reasons for forming the regional integration differs from one to the other. Regional trading
agreements offer preferential treatment to members of the regional integration in violation of the
Non-discrimination principles of the WTO. 25

To administer the preferential treatment

effectively, to exclude products exported from non-member, the members of the regional trading
agreement craft rules of origin. This results into a lot of crisscrossing resulting into the ‘spaghetti
bowl’ problem. 26

One of the causes of the proliferation of regional trading agreements is the stalemate
situation in the multilateral trading system as it goes between rounds. 27 For instance, “in the
period 1948-1994, the GATT received 124 notifications of RTAs (relating to trade in goods), and
since the creation of the WTO in 1995, almost 300 additional arrangements covering trade in
goods or services have been notified.” 28

The surge in regional trading agreements could also be driven by search for access to
larger markets in the absence of a willingness among WTO members to liberalize trade further.
Henry Gao 29 and C. L. Lim 30 believe that the existence of the WTO is being eclipsed into
irrelevance with the unabated surge in Regional Trading agreements. 31 At this moment this

25

See Supra note 13 for explanation of the non-discrimination principles of the WTO.
Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System, Oxford University Press, 2008, at 120.
27
Jagdish Bhagwati, Professor Columbia University, Supra note 2.
28
Regional Trading Agreements, Facts and Figures, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm.
Almost all WTO members are parties to one or more regional trading arrangement and some are members to more
than twenty regional trading agreements.
29
Henry Gao is Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University.
30
C.L. Lim is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, the University of Hong Kong
31
Henry Gao et al, “Saving the WTO from the risk of irrelevance, the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a
‘common good’ for RTA dispute”, Journal of International Economic Law 11(4), Advance Access publication 30
October 2008, at 899.
26

Thomas Cottier argued that preferential agreements have a limited impact on the global trading system. “The lack of
supranational structures in many other multilateral agreements inherently limits a process of liberalization much

12

might be an overstatement as we see the WTO’s successes but if no action is taken to harmonize
those regional trading agreements it is inevitable that it will be eclipsed into irrelevance. At
present a huge portion of world trade goes through those regional trading arrangements which
deny the Most Favored Nation Treatment to other WTO members. 32 The surge in regional
trading agreements also created very complicated rules of origin. Hence the need for
harmonization of regional trading agreements becomes necessary.

This chart shows all RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO (1994-2008). 33

beyond the dismantling of traditional barriers.” Supra note 19 at 514. In his argument he says that the MFN tariff
rate in GATT has been substantially reduced by the successive rounds. He also raises a point saying that most
preferential trade agreements other than the EEC and NAFTA do not liberalize trade in agriculture. Thirdly he
argues with the reduction of tariffs and quantitative restriction, countervailing duties and other non-tariff barriers
have become important. He also argues that there is a political limit to what preferential agreements can achieve.
32

Jagdish Bhagwati, Supra note 4. See Supra note 14 for a brief explanation of the Most Favored Nation Treatment
under the WTO.
33
This chart is taken from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm, accessed on March 19,
2009. When looking at this chart note the important dates for analyzing the chart. The Doha Negotiation Round of
November 2001 and the rise of notified regional trading agreements especially after the Cancun failure in 2003.
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In the next part of this paper we will discuss the various options that WTO members can
adopt to solve the problem of proliferation of regional trading agreements.

2.2. Harmonization of Regional Trading Agreements
A number of proposals have been presented for the harmonization of regional trading
agreements after the coming into effect of the Uruguay Round. “One proposal was that the
creation of preferential trade agreements requires tariff reductions with third members.” 34
Another proposal submitted was to guarantee a level of trade with third parties. None of those
proposals materialized.

The best tactic to approach the surge in regional trading agreements is to reduce all trade
barriers to zero at the multilateral level. Reducing trade barriers at the multilateral level will
render regional trading agreements ineffective. However, this option does not seem plausible for
three reasons:

1. The membership of the WTO is so big that countries might not choose to liberalize trade
for their enemies which could be members of the WTO. As we saw in the first part of the
paper countries enter into regional trading agreements not only for economic reasons but
also for political and security reasons.
2. Members of the various regional trading agreements might not agree to lower trade
barriers at the WTO level to zero in order to protect the benefits they are reaping from
those RTAs.
3. RTAs might cover sectors not yet under the WTO.

34

Thomas Cottier, Supra note 19 at 519.
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The second best option for the harmonization of RTAs is to strengthen the WTO’s
monitoring system of RTAs, with the 2006 rules on transparency being the most recent
example. 35 The critique against this approach is that the WTO committee on trade has been
plagued by ineffectiveness due to the consensus ruling making procedure of the WTO.

The third best option for the harmonization or RTAs is to draft ‘best practice’ RTA at the
multilateral level.36 The idea is if countries adopt the model RTA when they enter into RTAs
then it will result into harmonization of regional trading agreements and it will also lead into the
development of common law 37 of RTAs. However, it can also lead to further fragmentation as
states take and customize the model RTA to their particular need and concerns.

The third option would be to harmonize the existent rules of origin. The proliferation of
regional trading agreements created very complicated rules of origin on identical products. “With
the exception of the pan-European system of cumulation of origin which harmonizes the rules of
origin of some 30 Regional Trading Agreements …, most other Free Trade Agreements in force
have their own distinct origin regime.” 38 This added with the different tariff rates results into
crisscrossing of preferences creating the spaghetti bowl problem. 39 “Rules of origin are

35

The 2006 rules on transparency deal with the notification of Regional Trading Agreements to the WTO. Regional
Trading agreements formed under GATT art XXIV and GATS art V are administered by the Committee on
Regional Trading agreements. For further discussion of the transparency rule refer
to http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/trans_mecha_e.htm accessed on 02/10/2009.
36
Henry Gao et al, Supra note 31.
37
The term common law here is not here used as in the common law legal system. Here it is used to mean the same
or similar law.
38
Regional Trade Agreements Section et al, The Challenging Landscape of RTAs, presented at the seminar on
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO, WTO Secretariat, Geneva, 14 November 2003, pp 11.
39
Jagdish Bhagwati, Supra note 26.
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intentionally designed as devices to deny non RTA members preferences, it is doubtful whether
WTO member countries would be willing to get rid of these carefully crafted devices.” 40

In the next section we will discuss the WTO dispute settlement body as a means for the
harmonization of RTAs. At this moment the harmonization of RTAs through the WTO dispute
settlement body seems the most realistic solution to the proliferation of RTAs.

2.3. WTO Dispute Settlement Body
Before the Uruguay Round, when an RTA is challenged for its consistency with article
XXIV of GATT, the power to make recommendations was exclusively vested in the contracting
states. 41 During the Uruguay Round this has changed. “The Understanding on the interpretation
of article XXIV of the GATT extends the jurisdiction of panels to include review of preferential
trade agreements.” 42

Regional trading agreements are contracts entered into between states. Regional trading
agreements can be effective if the parties exert political will to abide by the terms of their
agreement and if it has an effective dispute settlement mechanism in case a dispute arises.
Regional trading agreements are enforceable if the agreement is observable, verifiable and

40

Henry Gao et al, Surpa note 31 at 4.
Article XXIV (7(a)) states, “Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an
interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING
PARTIES and shall make available to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable
them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate.”
42
Thomas Cottier, Supra note 19 at 519- 520. Article 12 explicitly states that: “the provisions of Article XXII and
XIII of GATT 1994, as elaborated and applied by the Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any
mater arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs unions, free-trade areas
or interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs union or free trade area.” Thomas Cottier, Supra note
19 at 519- 520.
41
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quantifiable. 43 Observablity is the obligations of the parties set out in the agreement should be
something that can be done. 44 When we say verifiable, it means that it should be something that
can be within the terms of the regional trade agreement. 45 Quantifiablity deals with the
assessment of damages in case of breach of the agreement. 46

To analyze if the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can be a solution for the
harmonization of regional trading agreements we should first consider the following issues. The
first thing to consider is the issue of jurisdiction. That is to say will the WTO dispute settlement
body have jurisdiction over RTA disputes? As we discussed in the previous section some RTAs
cover areas that are not yet covered by the WTO. For instance, when it comes to disputes dealing
with Article 11 of NAFTA 47 the WTO dispute settlement body will not have jurisdiction.

The second issue to analyze is what happens when RTA has an overlapping obligation
with the WTO. 48 For instance, almost all RTAs impose the National Treatment obligation.49 In
such, cases the WTO dispute settlement body will have jurisdiction.

43

Alexander keck, Supra note 7, at 7.
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
NAFTA is a free trade agreement between US, Canada and Mexico. Even though article 20 of NAFTA stipulates
that a NAFTA member can pursue its rights both under the NAFTA and WTO law when it comes to investor state
claims (Article 11 of NAFTA deals with investor-state claims.) the WTO dispute settlement body does not have
jurisdiction. For further discussion of the overlapping obligations under NAFTA and WTO law the Appellate Body
Report on Mexico-Tax measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages. In this case the US blocked the establishment
of a panel under NAFTA and brought a claim against Mexico under the WTO dispute settlement body for violation
of the national treatment principle. In this case the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement body was not
challenged by Mexico. Instead, Mexico was arguing that the Panel should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction.
The appellate body rejected Mexico’s argument and concluded that there is no legal impediment that precludes the
Panel from exercising jurisdiction. John H. Jackson et al, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 5th
ed. Thomson West, 2008, at 517 -520.
48
MERCOSUR is a customs union between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and Venezuela. A
MERCOSUR member can bring a case both in the MERCOSUR dispute settlement forum and the WTO forum.
Brazil brought a complaint against Argentina in the MERCOSUR dispute settlement body and lost. Later on Brazil
brought the complaint to the WTO dispute settlement body. The panel entertained the case and rejected if Res44
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The third issue to analyze is what happens when RTA has provisions that are contrary to
the WTO rules. In such instance, the WTO dispute settlement body will have jurisdiction over
the issue. 50 The interpretation of ‘substantially all trade’ under article XXIV can be a major issue
to challenge the inconsistency of RTAs with the WTO rules. When the WTO dispute settlement
body examines a regional trading agreement and found it to be inconsistent with the WTO rules,
it doesn’t make the agreement null and void but rather gives third parties the right to bring their
claim.

Judicata and estoppel can be applied here. John H. Jackson et al, Legal Problems of International Economic
Relations, 5th ed. Thomson West, 2008, at 517.
49
For an explanation of national Treatment under refer to Supra note 14.
50
In Turkey Textiles case the WTO dispute settlement panel found, that Turkey’s violation of GATT Art. XI and
XII are not justified by GATT article XXIV. In this case the Appellate Body agreed with the conclusion of the panel
even though it was for a different reason. For a brief discussion of the Turkey Textiles case refer to Michael J.
Trebilcock et al, The regulation of International Trade, 3rd ed, Routledge, 2005, at 197.
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Part III- Conclusions and Recommendations
Regional trading agreements are here to stay. They have been successful to achieve greater
economic and political integration in the world. Case in point the European Union is the best
example of deeper integration. However, they have proliferated in such an enormous amount that
they have created a lot of crisscrossing and different rules of origin. Hence, the need for
harmonizing them is a timely call.

The most realistic way to harmonize regional trading agreements is through the WTO dispute
settlement body. The WTO dispute settlement body has a well developed jurisprudence of over
50 years and has been effective. States should opt for a choice of forum of the WTO dispute
settlement body when they enter into RTAs. If the WTO dispute settlement body started
handling RTA disputes at the end we will have a common jurisprudence or law of RTAs. This
eventually will lead to the harmonization of RTAs. However, the monitoring and transparency
requirements that are administered by the committee on regional trading agreements should also
be enhanced side by side.

19
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